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answer is based on robert Adam’s social concept of obligation that has 
difficulties of its own.
The topic of this book is old and has been debated almost ever since 
there is philosophy (just think about Plato’s euthyphro-problem: Does 
God command good actions because they are good, or are actions good 
because God commands them?). The book does not offer any substantial 
new perspectives or aspects on this topic; this is partly due to the fact 
that it is very hard to come up with anything new anyway, partly due to 
the fact that those thoughts that are somewhat fresh (say by Craig, Hare, 
murphy, or swinburne) have been published, and published in much 
more detail, in similar ways by these and other philosophers elsewhere. 
still the book is laudable: It provides a good overview of what the main 
problems and arguments in this field are, and most papers are written 
by philosophers who know their stuff and express there thoughts in 
integrating contemporary moral philosophy and epistemology.
DAVID eFIrD
University of York
Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation, Oxford University Press, 2011.
‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God ... and the Word became flesh and lived among us’, so 
writes John the evangelist in the prologue of his Gospel. but how 
could the Word become flesh? That is, how could God become human? 
Answering this question is the primary concern of this anthology.
According to the Gospel of luke, when the angel Gabriel announced 
to mary that she would bear a son, she replied ‘How can this be?’ since 
she was a virgin. The angel replied that it would be by an overshadowing 
of the Holy spirit. one can view the papers in this anthology as possible 
continuations of the angel’s answer, for having given an account of how 
a virgin could conceive and bear a son, the question remains how the son 
she is to bear could be God the son. For this anthology aims to provide 
an account of how it is that God, or more precisely, God the son, the 
second person of the Trinity, could become human while remaining 
divine and a  single person. In this anthology, Jonathan Hill provides 
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an excellent introduction to the range of answers the angel could offer, 
giving a most helpful summary of the various answers the angel might 
give, and the subsequent papers develop some of these answers, making 
considerable advances in how we can understand how mary’s son could 
be God incarnate.
Very briefly, there are two ways of understanding the metaphysics of 
the incarnation which have received the most attention since mary’s ‘How 
could this be?’, namely, a compositional account and a transformational 
account, using Hill’s terminology. The two approaches differ primarily, 
in my view, in their answer to this question: is mary’s son God the son, 
that is, is Christ identical with the second person of the Trinity? The 
compositional account says ‘No’, but the transformational account says 
‘Yes’. In what follows, I will give a brief summary of these accounts with 
reference to how the papers in the anthology advance them.
on a compositional account, an account defended by brian leftow, 
oliver Crisp, and Thomas Flint in this anthology, the baby born of 
mary, Christ, is composed of two parts: a divine part, God the son, and 
a human part, a body and/or a soul, and the human part is the instrument 
of the divine part. What happens at the incarnation is that God the son is 
joined to a human body (and soul), and Christ, the baby born of mary, is 
composed of these two parts. Now, there seem to be two main objections 
to this account, namely, that it seems to entail that God never really does 
become human and that Christ is not one person but two.
In his ‘The Humanity of God’, brian leftow defends the compositional 
account from the charge that God never really does become human. He 
argues that, even though God the son never comes to consist of a human 
body or a soul nor do they ever become parts of God the son, God the 
son nevertheless is fully human since, by being joined to a  body and 
a soul, he comes to have a body and a soul. by making creative use of an 
analogy to a brain stem being grafted on to a body, leftow argues that 
the Word becomes flesh by having flesh grafted on him, and, in this way, 
God the son does indeed become fully human.
oliver D. Crisp takes a  similar view of the metaphysics of the 
incarnation in his ‘Compositional Christology without Nestorianism’, 
defending it against a  series of objections, in particular, against the 
objection that Christ is not one person but two, a  view known as 
Nestorianism. Nestorianism seems to be entailed on this account 
because it does entail that Christ is not identical with God the son, since 
God the son is a proper part of Christ. In response, Crisp maintains that 
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Nestorianism is not entailed since, though the account is inconsistent 
with Christ being identical with God the son, it is consistent with the 
person who is Christ being identical with God the son, and this is 
enough, claims Crisp, for Christ to be one person and not two.
Continuing in this line of thought, Thomas P. Flint argues in ‘should 
Concretists Part with mereological models of the Incarnation?’ that 
those who think that, when God the son became incarnate, he assumed 
a  concrete, created individual nature, a  human body and/or a  soul, 
that would have been a human in and of itself had the incarnation not 
occurred, should nevertheless maintain a  mereological model of the 
incarnation as that described above. Just how the human part of Christ is 
related to the divine part, and in particular how the human part of Christ 
is understood to be an instrument of the divine part of Christ is explored 
in detail in richard Cross’s ‘Vehicle externalism and the metaphysics of 
the Incarnation: a medieval Contribution’.
on a transformational account, God the son becomes human by being 
transformed into a human, that is, God the son undergoes change, losing 
some properties and gaining others, in a manner similar to a caterpillar’s 
transformation into a  butterfly. Thomas senor combines elements of 
the aforementioned compositional approach with this transformational 
approach in his ‘Drawing on many Traditions: an ecumenical Kenotic 
Christology’, by maintaining that God the son, having assumed a human 
body and mind at the incarnation, acted through this human body and 
mind on earth, and at the incarnation, God the son lost some properties 
he had when he instantiated only the supernatural kind, divinity, and 
gained some properties associated with the natural kind, humanity.
In contrast to senor, stephen T. Davis gives a purely transformational 
account in ‘The metaphysics of Kenosis’, where ‘kenosis’ is the Greek 
word for emptying, recalling Philippians 2: 6-7 which states that though 
Christ ‘was in the form of God,   [he]  . . . emptied himself,  . . . being 
born in human likeness’. The primary challenge of a  transformational 
account is showing that, following the incarnation, God the son, who 
is identical with Christ, remains divine despite the changes entailed by 
the incarnation. Davis aims to do just this, and, furthermore, argues 
that all orthodox accounts of the incarnation, that is, all accounts which 
affirm Christ’s full humanity and full divinity, must be kenotic accounts, 
since God the son must have given up something in the incarnation. 
Also giving a  transformational metaphysics of the incarnation, 
michael C. rea, in ‘Hylomorphism and the Incarnation’, employs an 
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Aristotelian metaphysics of material objects on which they are matter-
form compounds and builds on his prior work on the metaphysics 
of the Trinity to argue that, prior to the incarnation, God the son is 
identical with the matter-form compound divinity/sonship and after 
the incarnation he is identical with the matter-form compound Christ’s-
physical-matter/divinity and humanity, together with the individuating 
property, sonship.
A  particularly puzzling aspect of any account of the incarnation 
is Christ’s mental life. richard swinburne then gives what might be 
broadly construed as a  transformational account of the incarnation in 
his contribution, ‘The Coherence of the Chalcedonian Definition of the 
Incarnation’, where he focuses on Christ’s mental life, in particular, his 
having a divided mind. swinburne makes a most valuable contribution 
to understanding how Christ could be tempted, as the Gospels maintain 
he was, since, it seems, if he was truly tempted, he was not divine, but if 
he was not tempted, he was not human. swinburne’s solution is to say that 
Christ was tempted in so far as he was tempted not to do the best act, that 
is, something supererogatory. Joseph Jedwab further considers Christ’s 
mental life in his ‘The Incarnation and unity of Consciousness’, where 
he argues that Christ has not two spheres of consciousness, a divine and 
human sphere, but rather one sphere of consciousness, one part of which 
is typical of a divine consciousness and one part of which is typical of 
a human consciousness.
making use of recent work in the philosophy of mind, Anna 
marmodoro, in ‘The metaphysics of the extended mind in ontological 
entanglements’, argues that just as minds and external objects, such as 
notebooks functioning like memory, can be ‘entangled’ in such a  way 
that it is impossible to individuate them, so could God the son and 
Jesus be ‘entangled’. The final contribution to the anthology is robin 
le Poidevin’s ‘multiple Incarnations and Distributed Persons’ where he 
argues that there could be multiple incarnations, a question any account 
of the metaphysics of the incarnation must address.
This anthology is essential reading for all who are interested in 
a metaphysically precise understanding of the incarnation. The papers 
are of uniformly high standard and are rich with new ideas. It seems to 
me that our understanding of the incarnation might be further advanced, 
building on the ideas presented here in this anthology, by considering 
the metaphysics of the incarnation in light of recent advances in the 
understanding of the metaphysics of the Trinity, of original sin, and 
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of the eucharist. by engaging in systematic philosophical theology, we 
might hope to advance our understanding of all these doctrines together.
For example, as discussed by Flint, the simplest compositional 
account of the incarnation, one defended by Aquinas, is one on which 
God the son gains a part, a human part, such that the pre-incarnate God 
the son is identical with Christ. The best objection to this account is that 
it seems to entail that Christ both is and is not identical with the divine 
nature since: the pre-incarnate God the son is identical with the divine 
nature, and the pre-incarnate God the son is identical with Christ, it 
follows, given the symmetry and transitivity of identity that Christ is 
identical with the divine nature, but the divine nature is only a proper 
part of Christ, on this account, and so the divine nature is not identical 
with Christ. This is why the extent compositional accounts answer ‘No’ 
to the question, ‘Is mary’s son God the son?’. However, such an answer 
is not compulsory. It seems to me that there could be a compositional 
account of the incarnation on which mary’s son is indeed God the son.
As also discussed by Flint, one way to avoid the above contradiction 
is to deny the transitivity of identity, and one way to deny the transitivity 
of identity is by maintaining that identity is relative to a  sortal. on 
such an account of identity, of relative identity, the pre-incarnate God 
the son is the same nature as the divine nature and the same person as 
Christ, and it is not possible to derive a contradiction from these claims. 
Now, this response is not explored much by Flint. but it has been much 
explored in the metaphysics of the Trinity, particularly in trying to render 
consistent the Athanasian Creed, on which each of the Father, the son, 
and the spirit are God, but none of the Father, the son, and the spirit are 
identical with one another. Thus, it seems, there is mutual motivation 
for understanding identity as relative from an Athanasian approach 
to the Trinity and a  Thomist approach to the incarnation. Perhaps if 
these were done together, building, perhaps, on the seminal work of 
Peter van Inwagen, mutual advancement might occur in understanding 
the problems and prospects of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the 
incarnation. Nevertheless, this is a  first-rate anthology which will be 
a benchmark for future discussion of the metaphysics of the incarnation.
